Skip to content
Nobel Jews
Portrait of Eric S. Maskin
Photo: Nomo michael hoefner http://www.zwo5.de, Own work · CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons

Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences · 2007

Eric S. Maskin

He showed when rules can be designed so that people acting in their own interest still reach the goals a society wants.

The Nobel citation: “for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory”
Born
December 12, 1950, New York, NY, USA
Affiliation at the time
Institute for Advanced Study, USA

Economics prize

2007

Shared with 2 other laureates.

Age that year

57years

Born in 1950.

Headline credited impact

$1.3–2.3billion in economic value

Public revenue raised by government spectrum auctions, 1994-2025 (a proxy for auction theory's reach). How it was built

Sources cited

22

Fact-checked September 24, 2026.

  • The 1977 paper the Nobel committee singled out was not published until 1999. Economists already knew it from the working-paper version.
  • When he won the Nobel, he was living in the Princeton house where Albert Einstein had lived until his death.
  • He supervised Jean Tirole's PhD and also taught Abhijit Banerjee and Michael Kremer. All three later won the economics prize themselves.
  • As a Harvard math major, he drifted into a course taught by Kenneth Arrow and was hooked by Leonid Hurwicz's ideas. Hurwicz later shared his Nobel.
  • A clarinetist, he calls himself culturally Jewish and names klezmer and the dishes he watched his grandmother cook among the things he loves.

The breakthrough

Implementation theory: designing rules whose every outcome is a good one

Most economics studies existing institutions and asks what they will produce. Mechanism design runs the other way. Maskin calls it the engineering side of economics: start with a goal, then design the rules, or "mechanism", that will reach it. The hard part is that the designer does not know what people want, and people may shade the truth to get their way. Think of a parent splitting a cake between two children. If one child cuts and the other chooses, cutting fairly is in the cutter's own interest, even though the parent never learns how hungry either child is.

Leonid Hurwicz framed this problem, and later work showed how to search for rules that reward honesty. But one set of rules can have several stable outcomes, and some of them may be bad. In a 1977 paper, Maskin gave the first general answer to a key question: when can rules be built so that every stable outcome meets the goal? His test, now called Maskin monotonicity, says that if an option is the right choice and nobody comes to rank it lower, it must stay the right choice. A goal that fails this test cannot be reached by any set of rules. A goal that passes, with at least three people and one mild extra condition, can be reached, and he showed how to build the rules. In his Nobel lecture he works through the test with a planner choosing among gas, oil, coal and nuclear power.[2],[4],[5],[6],[7]

“The theory of mechanism design can be thought of as the “engineering” side of economic theory.”
Eric S. Maskin, Opening line of his Nobel Prize lecture, Stockholm, 8 December 2007[6]

What it meant for humanity

Maskin's work is about designing institutions, so its benefits reach people through better rules rather than a product. The Nobel committee said mechanism design helps economists tell when markets work well and when they do not, and find better trading systems, regulations and voting procedures. Implementation theory, the branch Maskin founded, became an important tool in the study of voting and of contracts.

He also worked on practical questions. With John Riley he showed how the best auction changes when bidders dislike risk. He also found conditions under which an ordinary rising-price auction puts a government asset in the hands of whoever values it most, which matters when states privatize firms. He carried these ideas into government. He advised Poland on privatization auctions in 1991, the Bank of Italy on treasury note auctions in 1997, and the British government on auctions for greenhouse-gas cuts from 2001 to 2003.

Auction theory as a whole has had large effects. Spectrum auctions of the kind the US first ran in 1994 had raised more than $200 billion worldwide by 2020, the Nobel committee reported, and the FCC's own tables add up to about $260 billion in the US by 2025. Other economists designed those auctions, so Maskin's part is small and indirect.

He has also brought his tools to public debates. With James Bessen he argued that patents on software may slow innovation in fast-moving industries. With Amartya Sen and Edward Foley he has argued in newspapers for better ways of electing leaders, such as ranked-choice and majority-rule voting. And he trained economists who went on to change their field, including the Nobel laureates Jean Tirole, Abhijit Banerjee and Michael Kremer.

  • Founded implementation theory, which asks when rules can be built so that every stable outcome serves a chosen goal. The Nobel committee calls it a key part of modern mechanism design.[4],[5]
  • Advised Poland on privatization auctions (1991), the Bank of Italy on treasury note auctions (1997) and the British government on auctions for greenhouse-gas reductions (2001-03).[11]
  • Auctions of the kind the US first ran in 1994 had raised more than $200 billion from spectrum sales worldwide by 2020. Auction theory, to which Maskin contributed, underpins them, though others designed the auctions.[5],[18]
  • Supervised Jean Tirole's PhD and taught Abhijit Banerjee and Michael Kremer, who all went on to win the economics prize.[2],[15],[16],[17]
  • With James Bessen, argued that in industries such as software, where each innovation builds on the last, patent protection may reduce overall innovation.[22]

Impact in numbers

Maskin's contribution is mostly understanding: a theory of when institutions can be designed to reach social goals despite hidden information and self-interest, and of when no design can. That kind of impact rarely has a clean number. We record one small, low-confidence claim: a 0.5 percent share of the revenue US spectrum auctions have raised for taxpayers, standing in for the practical reach of auction theory, to which his work with John Riley and on efficient auctions contributed. Most of that credit belongs to the economists who designed the auctions and to other auction theorists, including his co-laureate Roger Myerson. We put no numbers on his advice to Poland, Italy and Britain, his influence on voting reform or patent policy, or the work of the many economists he trained, because no study measures those effects.

EconomyFundamental scienceEnvironment

Each number is the laureate’s credited share of a real-world outcome, cumulative to 2025. The whole outcome, the share of credit, and the reasoning are shown so you can check the arithmetic. Outcomes shared with other laureates are counted once on the impact page.

  • Low confidenceRippleModeledEconomy

    Public revenue raised by government spectrum auctions, 1994-2025 (a proxy for auction theory's reach)

    $1.3–2.3

    billion in economic value, credited share

    That is 0.5% of $260–450 billion in economic value since 1994.

    How this number was built

    Same whole-outcome range as the Milgrom, Myerson, Harsanyi and Hurwicz profiles. Low: net winning bids in the FCC's 100 completed US spectrum auctions (1994-2022) sum to $259.1B nominal, rounded to $260B; bids refunded after the NextWave litigation (Auction 35, $16.9B) or paid to broadcasters (2016-17 incentive auction) are more than offset by not converting to 2024 dollars (CPI conversion alone gives ~$362B). High: the Nobel committee (2020) says SMRA raised over $200B worldwide vs over $120B for the FCC in 1994-2014, so at least $80B abroad; $260B + $80B = $340B, plus other non-US sales and inflation, rounded to $450B. Revenue is a transfer used as a proxy. Share 0.005: Milgrom, Wilson and McAfee designed the formats, Congress chose auctions, and Vickrey and others built auction theory; Maskin's auction papers with Riley and on efficient auctions are a small part.[5],[18],[19],[20],[21]

    Sources: Federal Communications Commission; Federal Communications Commission; Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences / NobelPrize.org; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), from US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Prize Committee, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences / NobelPrize.org

The double edge

No harms have been traced to Maskin himself or to direct uses of his work. Two cautions are worth stating. Mechanism design is a neutral tool: the methods that help a government serve the public can also help a seller or a monopolist capture more of what buyers are willing to pay, and Maskin, with John Riley, worked out the most profitable pricing plan for a monopolist. And his celebrated 1977 result was not fully proved in his original manuscript; other economists completed the proof in the 1980s. The result itself stands.

  • Minor

    A tool for sellers as well as for society

    Mechanism design serves whoever writes the rules. The Nobel committee noted that institutions tend to reflect the interests of their designers, and Maskin and John Riley, like Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen before them, derived the revenue-maximizing sales plan, built on quantity discounts, for a monopolist who cannot tell its customers apart.[4],[5]

  • Minor

    An incomplete first proof

    According to the Nobel committee's scientific background, the proof in Maskin's 1977 manuscript was incomplete. Complete proofs of his theorem were published by Williams (1986), Repullo (1987) and Saijo (1988).[5]

Against the odds

Maskin's story is one of opportunity more than obstacles, and no source records him facing antisemitism. He was born in 1950, as barriers that had held back American Jews for a generation were falling. From the 1920s, Harvard, Yale and Princeton used interviews about "character" to limit Jewish students, and in the mid-1920s there were probably fewer than 100 Jewish professors in American arts and science faculties. Most American medical schools capped Jewish admissions from the 1920s; the quotas were entrenched in 1945 and gone by 1970. After the war, barriers to hiring Jewish faculty collapsed, faster in some places than others: as late as 1964, Dartmouth had only two Jews among its 21 economics teachers. MIT had welcomed Jewish economists such as Paul Samuelson, Robert Solow and Franco Modigliani when such hiring was only beginning at Ivy League schools. It hired Maskin in 1977, and he learned from those same men over lunch. He grew up in a nonreligious Jewish home, went to a three-room schoolhouse in Alpine, and studied at the Harvard that had once restricted Jews. He returned there in 2012 as a University Professor.

  • —

    Quota

    Context rather than a barrier he met: from the 1920s Harvard, Yale and Princeton used "character" interviews to limit Jewish students, and most US medical schools capped Jewish admissions. The medical-school quotas were entrenched in 1945 and gone by 1970.[13],[14]

  • 1964

    Discrimination

    Context: American universities hired few Jewish professors before the Second World War, and barriers fell unevenly afterward. As late as 1964, Dartmouth had two Jews among 21 economics teachers. MIT, which hired Maskin in 1977, had been unusually open to Jewish economists since the 1940s.[11],[13]

Jewish background

Jewish fatherCulturally Jewish

Maskin was born in New York City in 1950 and grew up in a nonreligious Jewish home in Alpine, New Jersey. He has said he believes his father had a bar mitzvah, somewhat reluctantly, and that he himself had no religious training. Asked in 2007 whether he was culturally Jewish, he said yes: he listens to klezmer, plays the clarinet, and cooks dishes such as stuffed cabbage that he watched his grandmother make. He named Saul Bellow's Herzog as a favorite Jewish book. He has directed the Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory since 2008 and received an honorary doctorate from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 2018.[8],[11],[12]

Key dates

  1. December 12, 1950

    Born in New York City; grows up in Alpine, New Jersey, and attends high school in nearby Tenafly.[1],[2]

  2. 1972

    Graduates from Harvard in mathematics. By chance he took Kenneth Arrow's course, where Leonid Hurwicz's work on mechanism design won him over.[2],[11]

  3. 1976

    Earns a PhD in applied mathematics at Harvard under Arrow, then spends a year as a research fellow at Jesus College, Cambridge.[2],[3],[11]

  4. June 1977

    Presents "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality" in Paris, founding implementation theory; that fall he joins the MIT faculty.[2],[4],[7],[11]

  5. 1979

    With Partha Dasgupta and Peter Hammond, extends the revelation principle; with Jean-Jacques Laffont, proves a key limit on efficient trade.[4],[5]

  6. 1984

    With John Riley, works out the best auctions when bidders dislike risk and the most profitable pricing for a seller who cannot tell customers apart.[5],[11]

  7. 1985

    Returns to Harvard as professor of economics; he later co-teaches social choice theory with Amartya Sen.[2],[10],[11]

  8. 1997

    Advises the Bank of Italy on the design of its treasury note auctions, after advising Poland on privatization auctions in 1991.[11]

  9. 1999

    Publishes his 1977 paper in the Review of Economic Studies, more than two decades after it began circulating.[2],[4]

  10. 2000

    Moves to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton as Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science.[3],[11]

  11. 2001

    Begins advising the British government on auctions for greenhouse-gas reductions (2001-03).[11]

  12. October 15, 2007

    Wins the economics prize with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson for founding mechanism design theory. He is living in Albert Einstein's former Princeton house.[3],[8],[9]

  13. 2012

    Returns to Harvard as Adams University Professor.[10],[11]

  14. 2018

    Receives an honorary doctorate from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and gives its convocation address.[11]

Sources

  1. 1.Eric S. Maskin - Facts · NobelPrize.org (Nobel Prize Outreach), 2007
  2. 2.Eric S. Maskin - Biographical (autobiography from Les Prix Nobel 2007) · NobelPrize.org (Nobel Foundation), 2007
  3. 3.The Prize in Economic Sciences 2007 - Press release (15 October 2007) · Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences / NobelPrize.org, 2007
  4. 4.The Prize in Economic Sciences 2007 - Information for the public · Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences / NobelPrize.org, 2007
  5. 5.Mechanism Design Theory - Scientific background on the Prize in Economic Sciences 2007 · Prize Committee, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences / NobelPrize.org, 2007
  6. 6.Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals (Prize Lecture, 8 December 2007) · NobelPrize.org (Nobel Foundation), 2007
  7. 7.Eric S. Maskin Awarded Nobel Prize in Economics (Kelly Devine Thomas; Wayback Machine copy) · Institute for Advanced Study (Ideas), 2008
  8. 8.Nobel winner who's at home with Einstein (New Jersey Jewish News, 8 November 2007; Wayback Machine copy) · New Jersey Jewish News, 2007
  9. 9.Economics professor wins Nobel (The Daily Princetonian, 16 October 2007; Wayback Machine copy) · The Daily Princetonian, 2007
  10. 10.Economics Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin Returning to Harvard (Gautam S. Kumar and Julia L. Ryan) · The Harvard Crimson, 2011
  11. 11.Eric S. Maskin, Curriculum Vitae (April 2025; Wayback Machine copy of Harvard page) · Harvard University (scholar.harvard.edu), 2025
  12. 12.Noble Books: nine Nobel laureates reflect on their favorite Jewish books · Moment Magazine, 2008
  13. 13.MIT's Openness to Jewish Economists (E. Roy Weintraub), CHOPE Working Paper 2013-05 · Center for the History of Political Economy, Duke University, 2013
  14. 14.Why Did the United States Medical School Admissions Quota for Jews End? (Halperin EC), American Journal of the Medical Sciences 358(5):317-325 · PubMed / Elsevier, 2019
  15. 15.Jean Tirole - Biographical · NobelPrize.org (Nobel Foundation), 2014
  16. 16.Abhijit Banerjee - Biographical · NobelPrize.org (Nobel Foundation), 2019
  17. 17.Michael Kremer - Facts · NobelPrize.org (Nobel Prize Outreach), 2019
  18. 18.The Prize in Economic Sciences 2020 - Popular science background: Auctions · Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences / NobelPrize.org, 2020
  19. 19.Auctions Summary: completed spectrum auctions and net winning bids (Wayback Machine copy, July 2026) · Federal Communications Commission, 2026
  20. 20.About Auctions (Wayback Machine copy, January 2026) · Federal Communications Commission, 2023
  21. 21.Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items (CPIAUCSL), monthly data · Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), from US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2026
  22. 22.Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation (James Bessen and Eric Maskin), MIT Economics Working Paper 00-01; published in RAND Journal of Economics 40(4), 2009 · Massachusetts Institute of Technology (copy hosted by Université Toulouse Capitole), 2000

Fact-checked on September 24, 2026 by a separate AI fact-checking pass that re-opened the sources, with 9 corrections made. How we check

Suggest a correction